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ABSTRACT PAGE
The peltry trade in Virginia and New Netherland w as a  response to a significant decline in 
skins and furs from Muscovy during the seventeenth century. Overhunting of furbearing 
animals in this region led to a  decline in supply, and subsequently the demand for peltry 
allowed New World markets to become ever more important. This thesis compares the fur 
trade in the English-settled colony of Virginia and the Dutch colony of New Netherland to 
illuminate broader conclusions about the North American peltry exchange, involving 
Europeans and their Indian neighbors. The second half of the seventeenth century is the 
focus for the deerskin trade in Virginia, a s  this period encom passes the successful peltry 
business of William Byrd I and his uncle, the apex of Anglo-Algonquian violence during 
Bacon’s Rebellion, and the infringement of South Carolina in the Chesapeake deerskin market. 
The beaver fur trade in New Netherland began decades before the C hesapeake trade. The 
period from 1634-1667 is examined for the Dutch fur trade, a s  this timeframe encom passes 
Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s  journey into Mohawk territory, likely the first Dutch 
exploration to the Mohawk homeland, up to the English takeover of the colony. 
Anglo-Algonquian interactions were marked by more violence and hostility than relations 
between Dutch colonists and the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk; why this was the case  is 
the singular question this thesis strives to answer. The Dutch-Mohawk alliance was relatively 
peaceful, and no wars ever occurred between the New Netherland colonists and this native 
group similar to Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia.
European-lndian fur trading relations in Virginia and New Netherland were overall starkly 
dissimilar because of the dynamics of their exchanges, access to skins and furs, and outside 
forces beyond European control. Land encroachment, European competition in the fur trade, 
and mutual protection are important them es in addressing the divergent peltry trade models in 
the Chesapeake and New Netherland. This case  study suggests that when the fur trade was 
not mutually beneficial to the Europeans and Indians involved, conflict followed. The 
Europeans as  well as  the Indians sought to exploit each other, with the Europeans gaining 
lucrative skins and furs to export overseas and the Indians obtaining guns, ironware, duffel, 
and other desirable wares. The Indians were engaged in merchant capitalism as  much as  the 
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INTRODUCTION 
BUILDING A COLONY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were marked by European exploration 
and the discovery of new lands, peoples, and resources from the Far East, Africa, and 
North America.1 In the early seventeenth century, Spain was the leader in the 
colonization of the New World, conquering native peoples and acquiring raw materials to 
benefit the metropole. Spain’s riches from its New World endeavors led other European 
powers, such as England and the Netherlands, to plant colonies in North America, Yet, 
Spain’s wealth, Catholicism, and violent interactions with Native Americans confirmed 
the hatred England and the Netherlands felt towards their European neighbor, 
encouraging new approaches to settlement. The colonization practices the English and 
the Dutch developed in Virginia and New Netherland, respectively, retained a central 
aspect of Spain’s conquistador model: profit. Virginia and New Netherland were part of 
a colonial Atlantic world in which the establishment of settlements for the metropole 
initially lacked permanence and cohesion. The goal was revenue, and therefore the “get 
rich quick” system of extracting raw materials from the New World and returning to 
Europe was the very definition of colonization in the early seventeenth century.
The profitability of New World colonies was largely reliant on trade: between the 
colony and the metropole, between the colonists and native peoples, and between and 
within the colonies themselves. Prior to the establishment of permanent settlements and 
towns in North America, which brought some stability to colonial life, survival was
1 James Horn, A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth o f America (New York: Basic Books, 
2005), 11.
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almost entirely dependent on these forms of exchange. Most importantly, the colonists 
needed the natives to provide them with subsistence crops, as the colonists did not have 
ample supplies of food leftover from their voyages at sea. The settlers also needed the 
natives to teach them the skills of hunting and planting in a foreign environment. Trade 
with North America’s native populations, both in goods and know-how, was essential to 
the survival of European colonies in the New World. In telling the story of colonization 
in North America, trade is a central theme, and it is therefore the motivation of the 
narrative which follows.
This thesis compares the fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland to illuminate 
broader conclusions about the North American peltry exchange, involving Europeans and 
their Indian neighbors. The second half of the seventeenth century is the focus for the 
deerskin trade in Virginia, as this period encompasses the successful peltry business of 
William Byrd and his uncle, the apex of Anglo-Algonquian violence during Bacon’s 
Rebellion, and the infringement of South Carolina in the Chesapeake deerskin market. 
The fur trade in New Netherland began decades before the Chesapeake trade. The period 
from 1634-1667 is the focus for the Dutch fur trade, as this timeframe includes Harmen 
Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s journey into Mohawk territory, likely the first Dutch 
exploration to the Mohawk homeland, up to the English takeover of the colony. I will 
argue that Anglo-Algonquian interactions were marked by more violence and hostility 
than relations between Dutch colonists and the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk. The 
Dutch-Mohawk alliance was relatively peaceful, and no wars ever occurred between the 
New Netherland colonists and this native group. European-Indian fur trading relations in
2
Virginia and New Netherland were overall starkly dissimilar because of the dynamics of 
their exchanges, access to skins and furs, and outside forces beyond European control. 
This case study suggests that when the fur trade was not mutually beneficial to the 
Europeans and Indians involved, conflict followed. The Europeans, as well as the 
Indians, sought to exploit each other, with the Europeans gaining lucrative skins and furs 
to export overseas and the Indians obtaining guns, ironware, duffel, and other desirable 
wares.
Historians have conducted substantial scholarship on North America’s English 
colonies, emphasizing America’s foundations in purely English terms. In addition, 
scholars have focused heavily on a comparison between the model of colonization 
employed in New England and the model established in Virginia in an attempt to locate a 
normative settlement practice from which American culture is derived. The New 
England-Virginia comparison has also been of interest in examining the divergent 
developments of the North and the South as a response to colonization. This thesis shifts 
the focus away from a purely Anglo-American narrative, which has been exhausted in the 
historiography. Instead, this comparison sheds light on the colonization practices of two 
of Europe’s most similar nations, England and the Netherlands, both of whom were 
heavily engaged in the North American fur trade.
This comparison between Virginia and New Netherland is significant because 
England and the Netherlands were the only two Protestant nations in Europe during this 
period; both were trade-oriented, maritime, and had a mutual hatred for the Spanish, 
which influenced their overseas ventures. Trade was central to conflicts between the
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Dutch and the English during the seventeenth century. There is evidence that the 
colonists at Jamestown and New Netherland had contact with each other and traded 
goods along the eastern seaboard. The colonists’ interactions with different Indian 
peoples under unique environmental constraints, contributed to distinct European-Indian 
relations in these colonies. Why Anglo-Algonquian and Dutch-Iroquois relations 
differed primarily in the second half of the seventeenth century is the question this thesis 
strives to answer by examining the peltry trade as a case study.
Scholars have neglected a comparative history of Jamestown and New Netherland 
in favor of comparing English colonies throughout the Atlantic world. There are likely 
two reasons for this; the first involves a language barrier and the second concerns the 
English conquest of New Netherland. Colonial Dutch studies are still in their infancy, in 
comparison to colonial Virginia narratives, because there is only a small minority of 
scholars who can translate the seventeenth-century Dutch documents necessary to write 
an accurate history of the colony. Many colonial Dutch documents have been lost to 
history, and some have been difficult to locate in the archives. The work of Dr. Charles 
T. Gehring and his staff at the New Netherland Institute in Albany, New York in 
translating and publishing seventeenth-century Dutch documents has furthered the study 
of New Netherland. Moreover, his guidebook is cited by many Dutch historians, and his 
translations have been used by scholars interested in writing about the colony, including 
this graduate student. In addition to the language barrier, historians have shied away 
from writing a history of New Netherland in favor of studying English New York, as the 
English conquered the Dutch colony officially in 1667. However, English control of the
4
colony did not significantly alter the lives of the Dutch colonists, as their political 
institutions and laws were in large part retained. As opposed to reducing the colonization 
of New Netherland to a history of English New York, this thesis aligns with more recent 
scholarship in studying New Netherland as a value in and of itself.
Archaeological evidence has only recently shown how connected Jamestown and 
New Netherland were via trade. While addressing English-Dutch trade in North America 
may seem to be wandering from the main argument, discussing Jamestown and New 
Netherland as part of an Atlantic system of trade between England and the Netherlands 
further emphasizes the significance of this comparison and the interconnectedness of the 
two colonies. One of the most definitive ways to place Jamestown and New Netherland 
in an interdependent, Atlantic trade network is via the extent of the EB pipe trade. The 
Edward Bird pipe factory was located in Amsterdam, Netherlands, circa 1635-1665, 
hence the “EB” denoted on the pipe stems found by archaeologists in many seventeenth- 
century colonial settlements. EB pipe stems have been found not only at Jamestown and 
New Netherland but also in Brazil, the Caribbean, New England, New France, New 
Sweden, and Maryland. While historians have often focused on studying colonies as 
separate entities, archaeology has proven that colonization was not an independent action 
involving one people and one location, and the EB pipe trade is a quintessential example 
of this. Interestingly, Edward Bird was bom an Englishman and moved to Amsterdam as 
a response to the political upheaval in England during the reign of Charles I. He died in 
Amsterdam in 1665, having participated fully in Dutch commerce via his pipe making 
business and investing in New Netherland in 1646. It is not exceptional that Bird, a
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Puritan, would have found refuge in the Netherlands considering that Amsterdam and 
Leiden were havens for Puritans escaping religious oppression in England. Bird’s pipe 
making business and the extent of the EB pipe export market offers a fresh look at how 
colonies around the Atlantic intersected through trade. This trade good also confirms 
exchange between the English and the Dutch in the New World.
The construction of EB pipes suggests that Mohawk Indians in New Netherland 
were participating in this trade. Bird used 34 different pipe molds to meet the needs of 
his diverse customers around the Atlantic world, which shows that he had some 
knowledge of the peoples living in these distant places. This awareness of consumer 
desires was probably derived from letters and people traveling to and from the colony and 
the metropole. Pipes found at Fort Orange in New Netherland by Paul R. Huey, for 
example, were modeled after Native American patterns, suggesting that the Dutch 
colonists were modifying their orders from the metropole to meet the desires of their 
Indian customers. The adaptation of EB pipes proves an understanding and knowledge of 
other places outside Bird’s Amsterdam workshop and also the connection between the 
English, Dutch, and native peoples in North America. The EB pipe trade was not only 
encompassing European consumers but also Native Americans, illustrating the 
transmission and translation of culture. Jamestown and New Netherland were, in some 
sense, cosmopolitan as they were players in a vast Atlantic trade network.4
2 David A. Furlow, “Jamestown, Edward Bird, pipe maker and Dutch trade with Virginia” (presented at the 
annual Jamestown Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, November 10,2010).
3 Ibid.
4 According to David A. Furlow, at the time of Bird’s death, his estate catalogued 465,000 pipes in a pre­
industrial society.
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David A. Furlow’s compilation of archaeological evidence suggests that Dutch
f -u
merchants were involved in trading with Virginia in the early 17 century, . .buying 
tobacco and selling pipes, pottery, furniture, horses, and slaves.”5 Furlow’s presentation 
at the annual Jamestown Conference in 2010 emphasized that the Dutch were carrying 
large quantities of tobacco from Jamestown to sell in Europe, especially during the 
English Civil War. The extent to which the Dutch were involved in trade with 
Jamestown is reflected in Virginia’s opposition to Parliament’s Navigation Act of 
October 1651, which upset the Jamestown colonists as it “ ...limited their trade with the
/ r
Dutch and New Netherland.” Furlow also underscored the relationship between 
Virginia’s Governor Berkeley and New Netherland’s Director-General Peter Stuyvesant,
n
who corresponded with one another. Another important connection is Governor George 
Yeardley’s links to the Dutch. Yeardley was the governor of Jamestown from 1619 to 
1621, yet he was a military veteran who had fought for Holland during his teenage years. 
Yeardley was also accused of treason against the English for trading with the Dutch.8 In 
a comparative thesis involving Jamestown and New Netherland, the links between these 
two colonies, particularly in terms of an Atlantic trade network, cannot be overlooked.
The connection between England, the Netherlands, and their North American 
colonies was also manifested in Dutch artwork. For example, Pieter van Anraadt’s Still
5 Furlow, “Jamestown, Edward Bird, pipe maker and Dutch trade with Virginia.”
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Charles Hodges and Will Moore, “‘for ye defense of ye place’- State Salvage of Sir George Yeardley’s 
Fort and Moat, Conservation of Pooley’s Parsonage or Piersey’s Manor at Flowerdew (all ca. 1619-1632)” 
(presented at the annual Jamestown Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, November 10, 2010).
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Life with Stoneware Jug and Pipes (1658)9 shows a Dutch drinking vessel, similar to 
those found by archaeologists working at James Fort, as well as tobacco, likely grown in 
the Chesapeake. The painting features four pipes, which archaeology has proven was a 
product transported throughout the Atlantic world. This piece of art is not exceptional, as 
other Dutch artists, such as Hubert van Ravestyn, were painting similar scenes. The 
connection between the English and the Dutch in terms of trade was observed by many 
Englishmen and Dutchmen in the colonies and in the metropole, regardless of social 
class. It is highly likely that the trade network between England, the Netherlands, 
Jamestown, and New Netherland, impacted the lives of many more people than simply 
those transported to North America. From the colonist to the merchant to the dual­
nationality merchant to the consumer of Chesapeake tobacco and Dutch pipes who had 
never traveled across the Atlantic, the English-Dutch connection was real and part of 
everyday life.
9 “Pieter van Anraadt - Still life with earthenware jug and pipes,” in Mauritshuis, The Hague, The Royal 
Picture Gallery Mauritshuis, 2006, http://www.mauritshuis.nl/index.aspx?FilterId=988&ChapterId= 
2346&ContentId= 17423. This painting is featured in David Furlow’s presentation slide #3.
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JAMESTOWN AND NEW NETHERLAND: INITIAL SETTLEMENT
When the English colonists landed at Jamestown Island in 1607, supported by the 
Virginia Company, their goal was to extract natural resources from the New World for 
export to the mother country. The settlement erected at James Fort was never intended to 
be permanent. The gentlemen who traveled to the colony in its initial years lacked the 
skills and know-how to create a working colonization model, and the colonists were 
forced to rely on Powhatan expertise and com to survive in this foreign environment. 
Relations between the colonists and the Chesapeake natives seem to have been tense 
from the beginning of contact. J. Frederick Fausz argued that as early as 1609, the 
beginning of the First Anglo-Powhatan War, the colonists and the natives were engaged 
in violent conflict. Both groups were ethnocentric and competed for dominance in their 
trade dealings. The First Anglo-Powhatan War was the beginning of many violent 
clashes between the Europeans and Native Americans. This first war initiated combat as 
the primary means in which the colonists and the natives defended themselves and their 
identities.10 The English came to the New World to make a profit, and without 
considering their interference on native ways of life, the settlers attempted to do just that. 
The colonists searched for gold, struggled to produce glass, and grew mulberry trees to 
encourage silk production, for examples, yet none of these ventures proved successful. 
Jamestown’s unbalanced sex ratio also contributed to the settlement’s initial instability 
and militaristic quality as the nuclear family was virtually nonexistent. In 1635, the 
emigrant population to Virginia was eighty-four percent male, this after almost thirty
10 J. Frederick Fausz, “An ‘Abundance of Bloodshed on Both Sides’: England’s First Indian War, 1609- 
1614,” The Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography 98, no. 1 (January, 1990): 8, 54.
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years since the first Englishmen settled the Chesapeake.11 The colonists also suffered
from a high mortality rate due to the seasoning process. In contrast to the colder climate
in New Netherland, which tended to be healthier for newcomers, the Virginia
10environment retarded natural increase until the late seventeenth century. The early 
years of settlement were marked by disorder. The Virginia Company and the Englishmen 
on the ground attempted to establish a functioning, profitable colony in the New World 
with little prior experience to base their trials and efforts on.
Jamestown discovered its economic niche when John Rolfe’s tobacco 
experiments proved successful. By 1619, tobacco cultivated in the Chesapeake was 
exported to Europe, and the colony became a boomtown. Jamestown’s tobacco 
monoculture, accessible to a large population of Virginia landholders prior to 1660, led to 
colonial encroachment on native land, directly threatening the Powhatan way of life.13 
Tobacco was ultimately an export crop that did not require a working relationship with 
the natives to cultivate or sell the stinking weed. Tobacco was also more accessible than 
the trade in deerskin, which became profitable at mid-century due to changes in shipping 
costs. Fur trading licenses in the Chesapeake were restricted to Governor Berkley’s 
favored colonists, and therefore most English settlers could not enter this trade. This 
limited access to the deerskin export market motivated Bacon’s Rebellion, which was not 
only a royalist uprising but also a war against particular Indian groups for deerskin. The 
mutual benefits of trade between the English colonists and the Indians ceased to exist
11 Alison Games, Migration and the Origins o f the English Atlantic World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 83.
12 Ibid., 84.
13After 1660, Virginia society became increasingly closed to upward mobility.
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when tobacco became a cash crop at Jamestown and the trade in deerskin became 
increasingly restrictive.
While the English colonists at Jamestown did not have a profitable export trade in 
mind when they settled in the Chesapeake, the peltry market motivated the planting of a 
Dutch settlement at New Netherland in 1614 by the West India Company (WIC). The 
Dutch knew that valuable natural resources, including beaver furs, existed in New 
Netherland after Henry Hudson’s voyages in the early seventeenth century. Like 
Jamestown, the colony was initially a fortified settlement populated with Company men 
at Fort Nassau and later Fort Orange; in New Netherland, these men were heavily 
involved in the fur trade. While a faction of the WIC preferred to diversify the colony’s 
exports for greater profit, growing wheat and tobacco, these crops did not produce a 
boomtown. According to Adriaen van der Donck’s A Description o f New Netherland, an 
account of the landscape, resources, and natives in the colony published in 1655 and 
1656, the Dutch colony was established for the prosperity of the Netherlands. Van der 
Donck described the metals and minerals found in the region, including gold, reminiscent 
of the Jamestown colonists’ search for this soft metal.14 Despite all of the profitable 
resources Van der Donck believed New Netherland could offer, such as agricultural crops 
and wine, the beaver was the most important commodity in the region. According to the 
Dutchman, “...the beaver is the main reason and the source of the means for the initial 
settlement of this fine country by Europeans.. ..”15 Like Jamestown, New Netherland was
14 Adriaen van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, ed. Charles T. Gehring and William A.
Stama, trans. Diederik Willem Goedhuys (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 38.
15 Ibid., 115.
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a for-profit venture, and Van der Donck emphasized (and exaggerated) the colony’s 
resources and trade possibilities to entice his Dutch readership to cross the ocean.
In contrast to the peltry market in Virginia, the trade in beaver furs in New 
Netherland constituted the settlement’s leading export commodity and was accessible to 
Dutch colonists by 1640. The Chesapeake’s leading export crop, tobacco, infringed upon 
native land, eliminating the need for working relations between the English and the 
Powhatan. Yet, both colonies relied on the natives for food in the initial years of 
settlement, particularly maize. It is probable that the fur trade pacified Dutch-Iroquois 
relations for much of the colony’s existence, a point emphasized by William A. Stama. 
Interestingly, when the Mohawk were engaged in war with the Mahican, Dutchman 
Daniel van Crieckenbeeck, the commander of Fort Orange, fought against the Mohawk in 
1626. As a result, the fur trade diminished at Fort Orange, and Dutchman Pieter Barentsz 
was sent to defuse the conflict with the Indians. No records exist that the Dutch and the 
Mohawk went to war over the van Crieckenbeeck incident or at any other time in the 
colony’s history. The Mohawk-Mahican conflict may have reduced the threat of the 
Mohawk waging war against the Dutch.16
The relatively peaceful relations between the Mohawk and the Dutch were not 
replicated with other Indian groups. Kieft’s War was the outcome of Dutch attempts in 
1639 to force the Indians to pay tribute to the colonists in pelts and com to compensate 
for expenses acquired during the building of forts in the colony. The Dutch council
16 William A. Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” in Explorers, Fortunes and 
Love Letters: A Window on New Netherland, ed. Martha Dickinson Shattuck (New York: New Netherland 
Institute, 2009), 28-29.
12
believed that the Indians were also protected by these forts against neighboring native 
groups. Military action arose when the Dutch attacked and massacred the Raritan Indians
17in 1640 to avenge the killing of swine on David de Vries’s property. Dutch-Indian 
relations deteriorated until Company leadership was altered; at this time, the Company
1 ftrelinquished its monopoly on the fur trade in 1640. Dutch relations with the Mahican 
and Munsees were also tense, as the Dutch infringed upon the land of these two groups. 
This thesis focuses on Dutch-Mohawk relations almost exclusively because the Dutch 
traded beaver furs primarily with this group. Dutch-Mohawk relations were somewhat 
unique because of this trading partnership. Nevertheless, to understand the fur trade in 
New Netherland, relations with the Mohawk are essential to this study.
17 See J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Narratives o f New Netherland: 1609-1664 (New York: Bames and Noble, 
Inc., 1959), 183-234.
18 Jaap Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland: A Dutch Settlement in Seventeenth-Century America 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 76,110.
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CHAPTER I
THE NORTH AMERICAN PELTRY TRADE IN THE EARLY YEARS: 
CONCILIATORY EXPERIENCES
The fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland was a response to a significant 
decline in skins and furs from Muscovy, which included much of present-day Russia, 
during the seventeenth century. Overhunting of furbearing animals in this region led to a 
decline in supply. The demand for peltry allowed New World markets to become ever 
more important, as the Russian peltry trade decreased by 75% during the 17th century. As 
furs and hides were valuable commodities in Europe needed for the production of felt 
hats, coats, gloves, boots, writing parchments, furniture, and women’s corsets, the peltry 
supply in North America had an assured market demand in Europe.19 As furs and skins 
were shipped to Europe, the interconnectedness of European ports increased, with 
Amsterdam initially the center of this trade system and France the main supplier of North
onAmerican peltry. According to Linda France Stine, “Peltry was used in a variety of 
ways, but particularly to express status statements through personal adornment.” As the
semblance of a middle class developed in Europe, the decoration of skins and furs
01allowed this class to emulate its betters. According to Adriaen van der Donck’s A 
Description o f New Netherland (1655/1656), “That person among them who owns the 
most and the best ranks [of furs or pelts] as [is] the grandest, like someone here [New
19 Linda France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry: Colonial Perceptions of the Southern Fur 
Trade, Circa 1640-1740, ed. Stanley South (Columbia, South Carolina: The South Carolina Institute of 
Archaeology and Anthropology and The University of South Carolina, 1990), 6, 9.
20 Susan Sleeper-Smith, “Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World,” in Rethinking the Fur Trade: 
Cultures of Exchange in cm Atlantic World (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), xxv- 
xxvi.
21 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 6.
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•  00Netherland] who is decked out in fine cloth and gold and silver.” The demand for skins 
and furs made the peltry trade in North America a lucrative business, and therefore, 
extremely competitive. Susan Sleeper-Smith suggests that the Dutch, English, Swedes, 
and French all vied for control of this market between 1600 and 1640. France and 
England eventually dominated this business via access to the pays d’en haut after
O'XEngland took control of Dutch New Netherland.
Beginning in the 1620s, merchants became interested in the fur trade in Virginia. 
In the Chesapeake, the peltry trade primarily included the trade in deerskin, although 
beaver pelts were traded on a much smaller scale. At this time, the shipping costs to 
transport these furs and skins prohibited the colonists from engaging in this trade for 
export. As the cost of shipping became more affordable, furs and skins became profitable 
commodities. Nonperishable and easily transported overseas, peltry assumed great 
profitability in Virginia.24 While Tributary Indians assumed protection by the Virginia 
government in exchange for their skins, similar to the protection received by the Mohawk 
from the Dutch, Anglo-Indian relations were tenuous at best.
Early experiences in the fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland were somewhat 
similar, in that the colonies primarily organized their trading practices with the natives 
via trading forts; however, the WIC initially had a monopoly on the fur trade in New 
Netherland, whereas the Virginia colonists controlled the trade until Governor Berkeley’s 
restrictions. In 1645/1646, the fur trade in Virginia was organized by frontier trading
22 Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherlands 118.
23 Sleeper-Smith, “Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World,” xxvi-xxvii.
24 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 11,6, 14.
15
forts, with the leaders of these forts gaining wealth and influence from their position.
Yet, traders did move from village to village to obtain Indian goods.25 In New 
Netherland, the West India Company had a monopoly on the fur trade until 1640. 
Colonists were required to sell the furs they acquired from trade with the Iroquois to the 
WIC for a fixed price, resulting in minimal profits for fur traders. This monopoly was a 
point of contention between the colonists and the Company since the beginning of 
settlement in the early seventeenth century. The result was a high rate of illegal trading 
and smuggling of furs on Dutch ships. According to an ordinance of 1638, examined by 
Jaap Jacobs, the “.. .illicit cargo took up so much room in the holds of the WIC ships that 
hardly any room was left for the legal goods.”26 By 1640, the WIC had lost its monopoly 
on the fur trade and shipping to attract emigration to the colony. Amsterdam merchants 
thereafter controlled trade between New Netherland and the Dutch Republic. In addition, 
patroons, which encouraged agricultural production and the settlement of families to New 
Netherland, were permitted to engage in the fur trade outside of WIC trading posts; 
however a small fee per pelt was required for this privilege.27 Similar to the trade system 
in Virginia, most exchanges between the Dutch and the Mohawk occurred at trading 
forts, primarily Fort Orange for the Dutch. In contrast, the Mohawk also traded their furs 
by traveling to Dutch houses, negotiating for the best price, whereas Virginians 
occasionally traveled to Indian villages to trade. The practice of Mohawk Indians trading 
their furs door-to-door eventually led to tension between this native group and their
25 Ibid., 16, 36-37.
26 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 112.
27 Ibid., 140, 112.
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•  28 Dutch partners, resulting in legal measures in the 1650s and 1660s. In general, early fur
trading in these colonies between Europeans and Indian groups was peaceful and mainly
occurred at trading forts.
Thomas Stegge, the uncle of William Byrd I, was involved in the deerskin trade in 
Virginia, controlling a trading fort at the Falls of the James near present-day Richmond.
In 1670, when Stegge died, he gave his estate in Virginia and England to William Byrd I. 
Byrd consequently inherited his uncle’s lucrative Indian trading business. The will of 
Thomas Stegge illustrates the amount of wealth that one could gain from the peltry trade, 
particularly as a leader of a trading fort. For example, Stegge provided jewelry and 
money to help support his wife and sister and granted monetary awards to his mother, his 
sister’s children, and Sir William Berkeley. Stegge also owned an Indian girl, likely a 
servant, whom he gave his wife, Sarah. Moreover, he bequeathed Thomas Ludwell full 
ownership of the house, furniture, and lands that Stegge and Ludwell seem to have jointly 
owned. Virginia in 1670 was still a wilderness for many colonists where the comforts of 
England were lacking. Yet, Thomas Stegge’s will suggests that the trade in deerskin 
made him a very wealthy man, allowing him to emulate some of the luxuries of country 
gentry in England, such as the ownership of a servant, furniture, rings, jewels, and 
bracelets. Inheriting Stegge’s plantation and fort, William Byrd secured his financial 
status and influence in the Chesapeake.
28 Ibid., 116-177.
29 Ibid., 18.
30 “Will of Thomas Stegge,” in Virginia Colonial Records Project [database online] (Richmond, Virginia: 
The Library of Virginia, 5 April 1960), http://image.lva.virginia.gov/VTLS/CR/03546/index.htmI.
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To understand how the fur trade operated in Virginia, William Byrd’s experience 
provides a case study to analyze English-Indian exchange, despite the fact that his 
accounts are dated after Bacon’s Rebellion. Byrd had learned how to manage a fur 
trading business from his uncle Stegge, and it is likely that his business concerns and 
operation remained the same after the uprising. William Byrd’s involvement in the 
deerskin trade and tobacco cultivation is described in his letters to Perry & Lane, a 
merchant firm handling goods to and from the colonies. Byrd depended on the services 
of Perry & Lane to send his hogsheads of skins and tobacco to England. On April 25, 
1684, in a letter addressed to Perry & Lane, Byrd acknowledged the complaints of his 
Indian traders regarding the quality of English goods being exchanged for furs and skins. 
Byrd wrote, “I have had many complaints about my stockings this year as allso of hats, 
threds & some of the linnen, iron worke & nails the worst ever seen, which I hope will
o 1
hereafter bee mended.” This was not the first or last time Byrd voiced his concerns to 
Perry & Lane about shipments of second-rate English goods for trade with the natives.
'XOOn February 25,1683, Byrd mentioned complaints regarding duffields and cotton.
These complaints on duffel, a thick woolen cloth, were reiterated on March 29,1685. 
According to Byrd, the Indians did not wish to trade for light blue duffel, as “a darker 
blew pleases better.”33 On February 2,1684, Byrd asked Perry & Lane to speak to the 
gunsmith in England about the weaponry sent to Virginia. According to Byrd, if the dogs
31 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 25 April 1684, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of 
Westover, Virginia, 1684-1776, ed. Marion Tinling (Charlottesville, Virginia: The University Press of 
Virginia, 1977), 14.
32 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 25 February 1683, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of 
Westover, 10.
33 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 29 March 1685, The Correspondence o f the Three William Byrds of 
Westover, 30.
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of the gun lock did not have a good hold, the Indians refused to trade for them.34 Byrd’s 
letters to Perry & Lane suggest that English merchants were attempting to flood the 
market with low quality goods for trade with the natives. His correspondence to the 
merchant firm also illustrates the agency of the Indians and their influence over the goods 
that were shipped to the colony. The natives controlled the type and quality of goods sent 
to Virginia by their acceptance or refusal to trade for them. The Mohawk were also 
demanding consumers in their exchanges with the Dutch. They desired “hats, linen, 
shirts, and stockings” as well as duffel and ironware, including guns.35 On Harmen 
Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s journey into Mohawk settlements, he traded beaver pelts 
for awls, knives, scissors, needles, and blankets, probably duffel.36 Isaac de Rasiere, 
secretary of New Netherland in the 1620s, acknowledged that the Indians desired black 
duffel to prevent animals from spotting them in the woods.37 According to Linda France 
Stine, English trade goods may have had symbols of status to the Chesapeake natives, as
-1 Q
illustrated by the specific color duffel the Indians desired. From these examples, it is 
obvious that Virginia Indians and the Mohawk were unwilling to trade their skins and 
furs for inferior goods, suggesting that the peltry trade was mutually beneficial to the 
colonists and Indians alike.
34 William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 2 February 1684, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of 
Westover, 29.
35 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 137. Quote on page 137.
36 Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 1634-1635: The 
Journal o f Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert, trans. and ed. Charles T. Gehring and William A. Stama 
(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988), 16.
37 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 137.
38 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 30.
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The early experiences of Dutch fur traders in New Netherland are described by 
Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s account of exchanges with the Mohawk. Dutch 
merchants were attracted to North America to gain access to beaver pelts, as there was a 
highly profitable market for this natural resource in the hat-making business. From the 
beginning of their settlement in and around New Netherland, Dutch fur traders, allied 
with the Mohawk, came in contact with French fur traders in New France, who received 
beaver pelts from the Huron. The New Netherlanders feared French encroachment on 
Dutch access to furs in the interior. The Dutch were suspicious that the French would 
attempt to enter into a trade alliance with the Mohawk, negatively impacting the 
profitability of New Netherland for the West India Company. By the 1630s, the Dutch 
fur trade had declined. In 1634, the Dutch sent Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert to 
lead a three-party expedition into Mohawk Country to investigate the decline in furs, 
speculating French interference.39 According to William A. Stama, this may have been 
the first time the Dutch traveled to Mohawk Country, as Mohawk settlements did not 
border Dutch forts.40 Van den Bogaert’s account illustrates that Dutch relations with the 
Mohawk were pacified by circumstances outside of their control, namely French fur- 
trading operations in New France. Relations between the Dutch and the Mohawk 
remained mutually beneficial as both groups profited from the fur trade, and the Mohawk 
received Dutch protection against their enemies, including the French Indians.
As Van den Bogaert and two other Dutchmen traveled to the interior, they came 
in contact with Mohawk Indians traveling to Fort Orange to deliver furs to the Dutch.
39 Van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, xiii-xiv, xix.
40 Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” 31.
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Entering the home of a chief, the colonists .counted in his house 120 pelts of
marketable beaver that he had caught with his own hands. We ate beaver’s meat here 
everyday.”41 These pelts were almost certainly intended for trade with the Dutch at Fort 
Orange. Departing from this chiefs dwelling, the colonists made their way to another 
chiefs castle and traded an awl for a beaver 42 The beaver trade relied on the Indians’ 
access to Dutch trade items from which they could benefit, including guns. To support 
this point, when the Dutchmen encountered a Mohawk councilor on their travels, the 
Indian asked the colonists if they had brought gifts for exchange. When Van den Bogaert 
replied that they had not, the councilor chided them. According to Van den Bogaert, the 
councilor
.. .said that we were worth nothing because we brought him no gifts. Then he told 
how the French had traded with them here with six men and had given them good 
gifts; for they had traded in the aforementioned river [Oswego or Oneida] last 
August of this year with six men. We saw there good timber axes, French shirts, 
coats, and razors. And this councillor derided us as scoundrels, and said that we 
were worthless because we gave them so little for their furs. They said that the 
French gave them six hands of sewant [wampum] for one beaver and all sorts of 
other things in addition.43
Traditional historians have often focused on Europeans as the exploiters of native 
peoples. However, this passage, assuming Van den Bogaert’s account is accurate, shows 
that the Mohawk were just as likely to exploit the Europeans. The trade in furs was not 
only profitable for Europeans, but it also made the Indians the receivers of highly sought- 
after European goods. If the Iroquois, particularly the Mohawk, received a better price 
for their furs from the French as opposed to the Dutch, they would sell their pelts to




French traders. According to the Mohawk councilor, the Dutch were worthless because 
they did not offer the Indians a fair price for their goods.
This passage also suggests that the Dutch fur trade had diminished because of 
French competition, an external factor which never played a role in the Chesapeake peltry 
exchange. The French intrusion on the Dutch fur trade in the region clearly concerned 
the West India Company because of its loss in profits. It seems as though the Mohawk 
acted on fears of a potential French-Mohawk fur-trading alliance to secure a higher 
market value for their furs from the Dutch, a price greater than the French were offering. 
The Mohawk, like the Dutch, benefited from their alliance and wanted to remain partners 
in the fur trade. Yet, the Mohawk were unwilling to settle for meager items in exchange 
for lucrative pelts, just as William Byrd’s Indian traders were unwilling to exchange their 
skins for shoddy goods. As a result, the Dutch were forced to renegotiate the price of 
furs, an expectation of the WIC when they sent the Dutchmen on this mission. When the 
Indians offered five beaver skins to the Dutch, they requested “ .. .four hands of sewant 
[wampum] and four hands of long cloth [duffel] for each large beaver... .’,44 The 
Mohawk eventually settled for “four hands,” a price that secured a Dutch monopoly on 
Mohawk furs.45 After the Dutch and Mohawk agreed to a new price structure for furs, 
the Mohawk showered the Dutchmen with furs as gifts for the remainder of the 
expedition, reminding the colonists that if they received .more for their pelts, then they 





importance and benefit to the Dutch and the Mohawk, an incentive which sustained their 
partnership.
Van den Bogaert also recorded an interaction he had with several Mohawk 
Indians, who told him of their fear of the French Indians. According to this account, a 
central reason the Mohawk made peace with the Dutch was because they feared the 
Huron, refusing to travel to their settlements far in the interior despite the abundance of 
beaver there.47 The Dutch-Mohawk alliance benefited the Mohawk because they 
received protection from the Dutch against other native peoples via the arms trade.
In addition to Van den Bogaert’s account, Adriaen van der Donck’s A Description 
o f New Netherland describes the Dutch-Mohawk fur trade and its profitability for the 
Netherlands. Like their English counterparts in the Chesapeake, Dutch fur traders in 
New Netherland responded to the decline in peltry from Muscovy by exporting North 
American furs and skins to Europe, According to Van der Donck, the cold winter 
weather in New Netherland contributed to the high quality furs found there, arguing that 
“ .. .pelts and furs actually surpass those of Muscovy in beauty and quality.” Describing 
the hunting of the beaver by the Mohawk, Van der Donck claimed that the beaver were 
trapped by the Indians far inland, as the population of beaver had declined in and around 
New Netherland. According to the Dutchman, the Mohawk hunted the beaver in large 
groups, living off the land for a month or two at a time. During the hunt, which primarily 
occurred from December to June, each Indian trapped between forty and eighty beavers
47 Ibid., 14.
48 Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, 70.
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as well as other fur-bearing animals.49 In his account, Van der Donck suggested that 
. .an average of eighty thousand beavers per year are killed in this part of the country, 
not counting elk, bears, otters, and deer.”50 However, Jaap Jacobs argues that this figure 
is too high, as Van der Donck’s account was designed to encourage migration to the 
colony. According to records from the 1650s, the time in which Van der Donck wrote 
and published his account, approximately forty thousand beavers were killed per year, 
half the number Van der Donck attributed to the trade. This was a marked increase from 
the 1630s, in which approximately eight thousand to ten thousand beavers were killed 
annually.51 Clearly, the fur trade in New Netherland was a profitable business, which 
also made it highly competitive after the WIC monopoly was relinquished. While 
statistics on the Chesapeake deerskin trade are not available for the second half of the 
seventeenth century, statistics from 1700-1701 suggest that approximately fifteen 
thousand skins were being exported to Europe.52 While this figure was calculated after 
Bacon’s Rebellion, the trade in deerskin in Virginia was a smaller enterprise than the 
beaver trade in New Netherland.
Early fur trading experiences in Virginia and New Netherland were relatively 
peaceful. In both settlements, the Native Americans with whom the colonists traded with 
were demanding customers. For Europeans and the Indians alike, the peltry trade was 
favorable: the Europeans acquired lucrative skins and furs for export overseas and the
49 Ibid., 99,121.
50 Ibid., 99.
51 Jaap Jacobs, New Netherland: A Dutch Colony in Seventeenth-Century America (Boston: Brill, 2005), 
198-201.
52 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 11. Adapted from Crane 1928, Table 1, Appendix A, p. 
328.
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Indians received desirable European goods. When the Indians received items from the 
Europeans which were unfavorable or did not provide an even exchange, the Indians 
voiced their concerns. In this mercantile system, the Indians had control over the 
European goods which were offered them as well as their quality. To obtain profitable 
skins and furs, the Europeans had to appease the natives by granting them sought-after, 
well-made imports. Both groups sought to exploit each other to reap the benefits of this 
profitable trade. Unlike Virginia’s trade in deerskin, the fur trade in the colony of New 
Netherland had to contend with outside European forces, such as the French, who could 
damage Dutch relations and trading potential with the Mohawk. While European 
competition was a fear of the WIC and the Dutch colonists involved in the beaver trade, it 
also helped to pacify relations with the Mohawk. The Mohawk benefited from Dutch 
protection against the French Indians, or Huron. French competition likely served to 
create a pacific, working relationship between the Dutch and the Mohawk. In general, 
early experiences in the peltry trade for the English and the Dutch in Virginia and New 
Netherland, respectively, benefited the European colonists and the natives equally, 
creating nonviolent relations marked by mutual dependence.
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CHAPTER II 
VIOLENCE, TENSION, AND THE PELTRY TRADE
As the peltry trade developed in Virginia and New Netherland, tensions arose 
between the colonists and their Indian trading partners. In Virginia, these tensions turned 
to violence during Bacon’s Rebellion in 1676. While the Dutch in New Netherland never 
experienced combat with the Mohawk, competition over this lucrative trade in both 
colonies produced hostilities between the colonists themselves and between the colonists 
and the Indians. The later fur trading experiences in these settlements differed 
significantly. To understand this phenomenon, I will first analyze the underlying cause 
and circumstances surrounding Bacon’s Rebellion, as this uprising marked the peak of 
colonial violence with native populations in Virginia and therefore provides a way in 
which to measure tension against. I will then contrast this unrest in Virginia with events 
in New Netherland between the Dutch and the Mohawk over brokerage in the 1650s and 
1660s, which created unease in the colony but did not produce violence. After examining 
conflict in both colonies, I will assess the divergent experiences in Virginia and New 
Netherland in the conclusion.
To understand how Anglo-Indian fur trading relations broke down in the 
Chesapeake, Bacon’s Rebellion illustrates the apex of the tensions between the colonists 
and the Virginia natives. Historians have portrayed Bacon’s Rebellion as a turning point 
in Virginia’s colonial history. For Edmund S. Morgan, Bacon’s Rebellion marked the 
moment when white colonists realized their commonalities as a group and transferred 
their racism from Native Americans to Africans, an argument now taken as fact by
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historians such as T.H. Breen.53 Bacon’s Rebellion was the first popular uprising in 
America according to Charles M. Andrews and signified competition among rival elite 
groups for position in an increasingly closed society. Interestingly, Nathaniel Bacon did 
have a prominent supporter: William Byrd, the father of the well-known Colonel 
William Byrd of Westover. Bacon and Byrd were allies and neighbors, both heavily 
involved in the trade for furs, albeit illegally as they did not have proper licensure from 
Governor Berkeley. When Bacon and Byrd applied for a license as partners in the peltry 
trade in 1675, government officials denied their request. In March 1676, the Assembly 
excluded regular traders from obtaining licensure.54 Byrd encouraged Bacon to lead the 
rebels at Jordan’s Point, beginning the uprising.55 According to Warren M. Billings, 
historians have failed to produce an explanation for this event given its significance to the 
history of Virginia. Historians have argued that Nathaniel Bacon was a hero, juxtaposing 
Sir William Berkeley as a royalist villain. Interestingly, Wilcomb E. Washburn reversed 
these roles, and he instead emphasized Berkeley’s failed Indian policy as a key factor that 
lead to rebellion. Billings synthesized various arguments, suggesting that the uprising 
was a response to a tenuous society, burdened by taxes, low tobacco prices, increasing 
debt, and Berkeley’s lack of control in colony affairs.56 Whether Nathaniel Bacon or 
Governor Berkeley was a hero or villain is not the focus of this thesis. Bacon’s Rebellion
53 See Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal o f Colonial Virginia (New 
York: Norton & Company, 1975) and T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes, “Myne Owne G r o u n d R a c e  and 
Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
54 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 20. Marion Tinling, ed., The Correspondence o f the 
Three William Byrds o f Westover, 1.
55 Charles M. Andrews, ed., Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690 (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage 
Books, Inc., 1992), 110-111.
56 See Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom. Warren M. Billings, “The Causes of Bacon’s 
Rebellion: Some Suggestions,” The Virginia Magazine o f History and Biography 78, no. 4 (October, 
1970): 409-410, 423-424.
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demonstrates Anglo-Powhatan relations in the trade for deerskin as a point of conflict, 
both among the colonists and among the natives. By analyzing documents drafted by 
Bacon and his followers, personal narratives of the rebellion, Robert Beverley’s The 
History and Present State o f Virginia (1705), and the Royal Commissioners’ 1677 report, 
it is apparent that Berkeley’s Indian policy in regards to the peltry trade was a central 
cause of the uprising. When Governor Berkeley restricted the trade in skins, the mutual 
benefits of exchange between the colonists and the natives ceased to exist and conflict 
was the natural outcome.
In The Declaration o f the People, a document Nathaniel Bacon issued in 1676 
summarizing grievances against Governor Berkeley and his “Councellours and 
Confederates, Aiders, and Assistants,” Bacon pointed blame at the Governor for
cn
“advancing to Places of Judicature, scandalous and ignorant Favourites.” This 
statement is likely a reference to Governor Berkeley’s policy of issuing fur trading 
licenses to his elite friends, denying Bacon and other colonists the privilege of legally 
engaging in this lucrative trade for skins. This conclusion seems credible considering 
that Bacon’s subsequent grievance is related to the fur trade, suggesting that Berkeley and 
his accomplices have wronged the colonists “ ...by assuming the monopolie of the Beaver 
Trade.”58 In colonial Virginia, the beaver trade included the trade in deerskin, as 
deerskin was more readily available than beaver pelts and the quality of the skins in 
demand. This grievance explicitly states that the Virginia elite denied access to the trade
57 “The Declaration of the People, against Sr: Wm: Berkeley, and Present Governors of Virginia,” in 
Personal Narratives from the Virtual Jamestown Project, 1575-1705, Crandall Shifflett, 2000,
http ://etext.lib. Virginia. edu/etcbin/jamestown-browse?id=J1035.
58 Ibid.
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in skins to colonists outside of their closed circle of Mends. Moreover, this document 
argues that Berkeley protected certain groups of Indians at the expense of the colonists’ 
safety.59 After the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Virginia’s defenses were questioned by the 
colonists as Indians began encroaching on white settlements in the northern and western 
frontier lands, raiding these areas. According to colonial accounts, Berkeley was 
ineffective in preventing Indian attacks.60 The fact that these complaints are featured 
early in the Declaration, grievances three through six, and are mentioned explicitly in a 
total of five grievances, conveys that Berkeley’s Indian policy and restricted access to the 
fur trade were central causes of Bacon’s Rebellion.61
While the colonists petitioned the Governor to send volunteers to fight the Indians 
and to protect them from raids, public records from April 1676 suggest that the colonists 
initially did not wish to fight all Indians.62 Rather, it seems that the colonists had 
designated certain native peoples as Mends and the Susquahanocks and Occaneechee as 
enemies. Thomas Stegge’s trading fort, which William Byrd inherited, was located on 
the Occaneechee Trial, thereby providing access to trade with the Catawbas and the
fkXCherokee. Early in 1676, the colonists considered the Occaneechee to be their allies
59 Ibid.
60 Warren M. Billings, ed., The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of  
Virginia, 1606-1689 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 243.
61 “The Declaration of the People,” Virtual Jamestown, http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/jamestown- 
browse?id=J1035.
62 “Frontier Planters Petition Governor Berkeley to Commission Volunteers Against the Indians, CA. 
Spring 1676,” in The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 
1606-1689, ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1975), 267.
63 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 19.
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against the Doegs and the Susquahanocks.64 When the Occaneechee refused to give the 
spoils, namely furs and skins, from their raids on the Susquahanocks to Nathaniel Bacon 
during the rebellion, the Occaneechee became the enemies of the colonists. After 
Bacon’s Rebellion, the Occaneechee traded with the colonists, including William Byrd, 
on a much smaller scale, and it seems as if this native group never reassumed its 
prominence in the Virginia peltry trade.65
In response to Berkeley’s incompetence in dealing with Indian attacks, the 
colonists attempted to take matters into their own hands to protect themselves from harm. 
Yet, when seeking aid from friendly natives, the colonists recorded that .the Indians in 
all places [were] unwilling to assist us against the Common Enemy [the Susquahanocks 
and Occaneechee], they having received orders to the contrary from the Right 
Honourable the Govemer....” As a result, the colonists were forced to seek Indian aid 
further from Jamestown, obtaining only 24 men from the Nottowaies and Mayherings.67 
In essence, Berkeley’s Indian policy divided native groups, who competed against each 
other for natural resources, deerskin and furs, as well as Berkeley’s favor in trading with 
the colonial elite. In providing aid to Bacon and his supporters, these Indian peoples 
would forfeit their ability to trade deerskin with Berkeley’s associates. Bacon’s response, 
to travel deeper into the south to gain Indian allies, brought more Indian nations into the 
conflict. Bacon’s anger over Berkeley’s monopoly on this profitable trade eventually led
64 “Nathaniel Bacon’s Victory Over the Indians, April 1676,” in The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth 
Century: A Documentary History o f Virginia, 1606-1689, ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 267.
65 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 21-22.
66 “Nathaniel Bacon’s Victory Over the Indians, April 1676,” 267.
67 Ibid.
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him and his supporters to bring civil war and destruction to all enemy (and oftentimes 
friendly) Indian nations. Bacon’s motives for leading the rebellion were twofold: access 
to the deerskin trade and profit from this market.
A letter written by a Virginian, Mrs. An. Cotton, to a Mr. C.H. at Yardly in 
Northamptonshire, explains the events surrounding Bacon’s Rebellion and reinforces the 
importance of the deerskin trade as a catalyst for revolt. While Mrs. Cotton’s letter was 
written in 1686, a decade after the uprising, her recollection of the events supports other 
documentation and provides an eyewitness account of Bacon’s Rebellion from a female 
Virginian who was not directly involved in the fighting. According to Mrs. Cotton, 
Nathaniel Bacon questioned the Governor and those in power as to how they had 
obtained their wealth. Mrs. Cotton implied in her letter that Bacon believed the 
authorities were stealing from the public treasury for their own advancement and had 
profited from a monopoly on the deerskin trade. Moreover, Mrs. Cotton suggests that 
Bacon believed that the authorities, who were the trading partners of the natives, were 
selling “.. .the blood of there bretheren and country men” by providing the Indians with 
weapons, contrary to colonial law.68 Mrs. Cotton’s account is in accordance with other 
sources and suggests that Bacon wanted access to the fur trade for monetary gain, 
envious of the wealth Berkeley and his grandees acquired through the trade in deerskin.
Bacon’s Manifesto supports the grievances defined by The Declaration o f  the
People, colonial public records, and Mrs. Cotton’s letter. For example, Bacon argued in
68 Mrs. An. Cotton, of Q. Creeke, “An Account of our Late Troubles in Viriginia, Written in 1686,” in 
Personal Narratives from the Virtual Jamestown Project, 1575-1705, Crandall Shifflett, 2000, 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/jamestown-browse?id=J 1058.
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his manifesto that Governor Berkeley defended and protected Indian groups who invaded 
the colonists, rejecting the complaints of these “Most loyall Subjects” against the 
natives.69 Berkeley continued to arm the Indians despite colonial Virginia laws which 
prohibited this practice. While Berkeley likely provided the natives with ammunition to 
hunt deer for their skins, in his manifesto, Bacon argued that these guns were being used 
against the colonists and were “destructfull to us.” This document suggests that 
Governor Berkeley blamed Bacon and his followers for ruining trade and commerce with 
the natives, despite the fact that the Indians, according to Bacon, were murdering 
innocent Virginians. Bacon’s manifesto concludes that the peltry trade was the root 
cause of the Indian attacks and the subsequent rebellion. Bacon writes, “If it should be 
said that the very foundation of all these disasters the Grant of the Beaver trade to the
Right Honourable Govemour was illegall and not granteable by any power here present
7n
as being a monopoly, were not this to deserve the name of Rebell and Traytor.” This 
manifesto makes clear that Bacon and his followers believed that the Governor was a 
traitor to the colonists because he was providing fur trading licenses to his allies, of 
which Bacon and most other colonists were excluded. These colonists believed that 
Berkeley’s monopoly on the deerskin and beaver pelt trade was unlawful and contributed 
to Berkeley’s indifference to Indian attacks against loyal subjects and their plantations. 
Warren M. Billings has argued that scholars have placed too much emphasis on 
manifestos drafted by Bacon or his supporters. While the manifestos present charges
69 “Bacon’s ‘Manifesto,’” in The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of 
Virginia, 1606-1689, ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1975), 278.
70 Ibid., 279.
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against Governor Berkeley at the time of rebellion, Billings suggests that these 
documents are nothing more than “skillful propaganda documents which played upon 
latent discontent with devastating effect.”71 Despite the fact that these documents may be 
exaggerations of the truth, the claims Bacon asserted against the Governor in his 
manifesto are supported by other primary sources from the period. In addition, while the 
manifesto may have been aimed to persuade, there is truth behind influential, exaggerated 
narratives. The numerous references to the southern fur trade in this manifesto and other 
documents during the rebellion cannot be ignored. While Berkeley’s monopoly may not 
have angered all of Bacon’s supporters, it is clearly the foundation of Nathaniel Bacon’s 
rebellious actions. Truth lies behind Bacon’s embellishments.
Robert Beverley, one of the Governor’s “pernicious” assistants listed by Bacon in 
The Declaration o f the People, provided an account of the rebellion in his book, The 
History and Present State o f Virginia (1705). While this account, like Mrs. Cotton’s 
letter, was written after the uprising, Beverley, apparently one of Bacon’s adversaries, 
acknowledged the role of the fur trade in producing the rebellion. Beverley argued that 
Bacon wanted the Governor to grant him a commission to fight the Indians to “ .. .secure a
77Monopoly of the Indian Trade to himself and his Friends.” In addition, when Governor 
Berkeley fled to Accomack, fearing the march of the Baconites to Jamestown, he was not 
welcomed by the colonists. Instead, the people of Accomack . .began to make Terms 
with him [Berkeley] for Redress of their Grievances, and for the Ease and Liberty of
71 Billings, “The Causes of Bacon’s Rebellion,” 415.
72 Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, ed. Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 81, para. 102.
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Trade.”73 The right to freely trade with the natives was a central grievance of Nathaniel 
Bacon as well as many colonial subjects. Even Bacon’s foe, Robert Beverley, 
acknowledged the restricted access to the fur trade as a key motivation for Bacon’s 
actions. After Sir William Berkeley was recalled to England, the new Governor, Herbert 
Jeffreys, straightaway attempted to establish peace and allowed free trade between the 
colonists and the natives. While Governor Jeffreys restrained trade with the Indians to 
certain Marts, he did attempt to rectify the colonists’ complaints against Berkeley’s 
restrictive fur trading licenses. According to Beverley, the Indians refused to bring their 
commodities to certain marts, which made the new restrictions useless.74 Yet, the fact 
that Jeffreys, upon taking office, permitted the colonists to trade freely with the Indians 
showcases the significance of trade, particularly the fur trade, to Bacon’s Rebellion.
In September 1676, news of Bacon’s Rebellion travelled to England. In 1677, the 
same year in which Governor Berkeley was recalled by the Crown, the King sent a 
special commission and English troops to Virginia to settle the colony’s affairs. The 
subsequent report by the commissioners illustrates their conviction that the Governor and 
his elite friends were responsible for the uprising; again, the fur trade takes a leading role 
in the narrative documented by the King’s commissioners.
Investigating local complaints, the commissioners concluded that the colonists 
were resentful of Sir William Berkeley and his trusted circle of friends, who had a 
monopoly on the fur trade. The colonists were also angered by the Governor’s defense of
73 Ibid., 81, para. 105.
74 Ibid., 86-87, para. 115.
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the Indians and his unwillingness to protect them from attack. The narrative of the
commissioners explicitly states these points:
This made the People jealous that the Governor for the lucre of the Beaver and 
otter trade etc. with the Indians, rather sought to protect the Indians than them, 
Since after publick Proclamation prohibiting all trade with the Indians (they 
complaine) hee privately gave commission to some of his Friends to truck with 
them, and that those persons furnished the Indians with Powder, Shott etc. soe that 
they were better provided than his Majestye’s Subjects.75
The commissioners also recounted that Governor Berkeley forbade the colonists to attack 
the Indians without first receiving orders to do so. This angered the colonists, who 
believed their lives and property were in danger. The commissioners suggested that the 
colonists had no way of knowing a friendly Indian from an enemy as it was illegal for 
them to engage in open or free trade with the Indians. Yet, it is important to 
acknowledge that some Indians did support the colonists, as Bacon had Indian scouts in 
his army. According to the commissioners’ report, Bacon’s army was served by some ten 
Indians who spied and killed other Indian parties. To some extent, Bacon’s Rebellion 
was also an Algonquian civil war in that groups of Indians fought each other to obtain the 
skins and furs desired by the Englishmen. Access to this highly profitable trade in skins 
was of the utmost importance to both the colonists and Indians alike, with all classes of 
colonists and various Indian nations competing for entry into this market. With the 
tobacco market depressed by overproduction and the selling of poor quality tobacco, the 
deerskin trade was an avenue to wealth and success in colonial Virginia. It is no surprise 
that skins and furs were prized by Bacon and his followers as bootie from raids on Indian
75 Andrews, ed., Narratives o f the Insurrections, 109.
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settlements. Low tobacco prices and debt led many colonists to believe that the export 
of deerskin was the path to upward mobility, which seems to have been the Baconites’ 
goal: to get rich from the deerskin market.
Bacon’s Rebellion was a response to the restrictive trade practices Governor 
Berkeley and his associates had exercised, preventing the colonists and natives from 
openly and freely trading deerskin and beaver pelts. Berkeley and his grandees desired a 
monopoly on the fur trade because skins and furs were highly profitable export 
commodities. With a declining economy due to low tobacco prices, access to the 
deerskin trade was crucial to the colonists’ monetary success. By examining a wide 
range of documents which describe the uprising, the fur trade is clearly at the heart of the 
conflict. The trade for furs in Virginia divided the Englishmen and their native neighbors 
as all groups involved were driven by personal gain. For the colonists, the mutual 
benefits of the peltry exchange ceased to exist when Governor Berkeley restricted their 
access to this trade. For the natives, the encroachment by the colonists on Indian lands to 
grow tobacco had long put a wedge in their relations with the English. During Bacon’s 
Rebellion, the Indians were forced to compete for favor among divisive Virginians, 
which created conflict between the Indians and the English as well as among different 
Indian groups. Bacon’s Rebellion illustrates the peltry trade at its worst, a period when 
the trade was not mutually beneficial to the English or the Indians.
After the uprising and the subsequent reform measures instituted by Governor 
Jeffreys, some semblance of the peltry trade did survive in Virginia, and William Byrd
76 Ibid., 112-113, 124-125,127.
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remained a key player in this market. While Byrd was profiting from his exchange with 
the natives, as illustrated by the goods he purchased for his private use from Perry &
77 » ■ .Lane, it is also clear that there was tension between the Virginians and the Indians after 
Bacon’s Rebellion. In 1679, Byrd became colonel of the militia to command the Falls of 
the James, as Byrd had a reputation for being an expert on the natives.78 In a letter 
addressed to Thomas Grendon, a member of Byrd’s extended family, on April 29, 1684, 
Byrd mentioned that he spoke to Seneca Indians and that they . .promised to behave 
themselves hereafter very peaceable towards the English.”79 While Byrd did not 
elaborate on the circumstances surrounding his conversation with the Seneca, as the 
reader probably had some knowledge of the situation, a conflict of unknown cause did 
arise between the two groups. This was not an exceptional case and illustrates the more 
violent relations between the English and the Indians throughout Virginia’s colonial 
history, as compared to New Netherland.
By the late seventeenth century, South Carolinians became competitors against 
Virginia’s access to the peltry supply, trading with the Catawba and Cherokee as well as 
the Lower Creeks.80 With the fur trading market increasingly accessible to more 
colonists after the Proprietors relinquished their monopoly in the 1690s, South 
Carolinians protected their relations with the natives and rejected Indian slavery as the
77 See William Byrd to Perry & Lane, 30 July 1688, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of 
Westover, 85-86. Byrd tells Perry & Lane to send him one dozen shoes for his wife, slippers, children’s 
shoes, table linen, etc.
78 Marion Tinling, ed., The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of Westover, 4.
79 William Byrd to Thomas Grendon, 29 April 1684, The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of 
Westover, 16.
80 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 24.
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central labor force of the colony.81 According to Linda France Stine, “By the mid-1690s, 
deerskins were worth more than [African] slaves. At this time, there were fewer 
restrictions on trade, and deerskins were the most valuable commodity shipped to 
England....” Virginians abandoned the fur trade due to competition from South
Carolina, concentrating their efforts on other export markets, including agriculture, by the 
close of the seventeenth century. Bacon’s Rebellion and especially the interference by 
South Carolina’s fur traders depressed the lucrative peltry business in the Chesapeake.
In contrast to the fur trade in Virginia, the trade in beaver furs in New Netherland, 
the colony’s leading export commodity and accessible to Dutch colonists after 1640, 
required a strong and cohesive partnership between the colonists and the Mohawk, their 
principal exchange allies. When the settlement was merely a fur-trade outpost in 1609, 
the beaver had been overhunted in the coastal regions and around the Hudson Valley.
The Dutch relied on the Mohawk to obtain furs, as these natives traveled into the interior 
to hunt the beaver. This in turn made the coastal Indians, who lived in areas where fur- 
bearing animals were near extinction, less valuable. Historian William A. Stama argues 
that Dutch relations with the surrounding native populations were more complex than 
Allen Trelease argued in Indian Affairs in Colonial New York (1960). Stama suggests 
that merely dividing the Indian groups into “expendable” and “valuable” based on their 
access and control over the peltry supply, which was the premise of Trelease’s work, 
simplifies Dutch-Indian relations.83 Stama suggests that both the Dutch and the Mohawk
81 Peter H. Wood, Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina From 1670 Through the Stono 
Rebellion (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1974), 39.
82 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 25.
83 Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” 27-28.
38
interpreted their relationship as mutually beneficial; the Mohawk had more to gain from 
the Dutch than material goods, a claim supported by the primary evidence. Dutch- 
Mohawk relations were pacific for two reasons. First, the Mohawk received guns and 
protection from the Dutch against their competitors in the interior in exchange for beaver 
pelts, a profitable export commodity for the Dutch. Second, the Dutch did not engage in 
land sales with the Mohawk until late in the colony’s existence. Dutch protection 
coupled with the lack of encroachment on Mohawk lands contributed to a trade 
partnership which was accommodating to the Mohawk while simultaneously beneficial to 
the Dutch who obtained sought-after furs.
Due to the depletion of furs near New Netherland, an area encompassing Munsee 
and Mahican territory in the lower Hudson Valley, these Algonquian peoples sold their 
land for Dutch trade goods. While private persons were required to have their land sales 
with the Indians approved by Dutch officials under the Freedoms and Exemptions of 
1629, it seems as though some colonists were acting independent of the director and 
council to gain land from the natives. Potentially a response to Dutch-Algonquian 
conflict over land, the 1652 ordinance reiterated the importance of land for the colony, 
not individuals. The Dutch purchased large tracks of land from the Munsee and the 
Mahican, as these lands abutted Fort Orange and New Amsterdam. By contrast, the 
Mohawk lived further in the interior and did not have constant contact with the Dutch. 
Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s 1634 account is the first record of Dutchmen 
journeying to Mohawk territory after more than two decades of trade with this Iroquoian
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• 84  •group. The Dutch did not engage in land sales with the Mohawk until 1661. According 
to William A. Stama, “.. .the late acquisition of Mohawk land by the Dutch most 
certainly acted to forestall and perhaps avoid altogether the violent clashes that marked 
Dutch-Algonquian relations in the Hudson Valley.”85 The Dutch clearly had a unique 
trading relationship with the Mohawk, their partners in the fur trade. By not infringing 
upon Mohawk land, and therefore Mohawk settlement practices and ways of life, this, in 
part, pacified Dutch relations with these native peoples.
When the WIC abandoned its monopoly on the fur trade in New Netherland, its 
practice of fixing the price for beaver furs was also eliminated. Individual colonists 
subsequently decided the price they paid for this profitable resource; however, trading 
alcohol or guns to the natives in exchange for their furs was illegal. In a Fort Orange 
court session held on July 16,1658, Poulus Janssen was charged with selling brandy to 
the Indians. According to the court, this was “...a matter of very dangerous consequence,
8 f \which cannot be tolerated in a country where justice prevails.” Janssen was banished 
from the province for six years and ordered to pay 500 guilders as punishment for his
87unlawful action. Jaap Jacobs has argued that despite the severe sentences proscribed by
the laws governing New Netherland, punishments were more lenient in practice and
88banishment was rarely carried out. The Mohawk also appeared before the court at Fort 
Orange to complain of the sale of alcohol. On September 6, 1659, the Mohawk requested
84 Ibid., 30-32.
85 Ibid., 32.
86 Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., Fort Orange Court Minutes, 1652-1660 (New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 1990), 388.
87 Ibid., 388.
88 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 115.
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that alcohol not be sold to the Indians in exchange for furs. According to the Indians, 
“We have to anticipate our enemies, the French; and if we drink ourselves drunk, we
O Q  ^
cannot fight.” While some natives desired alcohol as a way to become closer with the 
spiritual world, it seems as though New Netherland officials and Mohawk leaders were 
against this practice.90 Selling alcohol to Indians was a threat to New Netherland’s 
security, according to the magistrates; Mohawk leaders, who needed their warriors 
prepared for enemy attacks, also frowned upon the practice.
The sale in guns and powder to the Indians was also severely punished by law to 
protect the colony. The death penalty was required by ordinances passed in 1639 and 
reiterated in 1645 for any colonist who sold weapons to the Indians. However, as guns 
became attractive commodity goods to the Iroquois, the Dutch could not refuse to offer 
weapons in exchange for furs. In response, the arms trade in the colony was theoretically 
monopolized by the government. Dutch officials believed that if the traders did not sell 
weapons and powder to the Mohawk, these Indians would trade with the English instead, 
depressing the Dutch peltry trade. Despite the legal prohibition of this practice, 
individual colonists did exchange guns for furs according to court records and 
archaeology, as weapons have been found in Indian burial sites 91 Interestingly, the 
Mohawk came to Fort Orange in 1659 to demand that their guns be repaired by Dutch 
blacksmiths for free if the Indians did not have se want and that powder be provided to
89 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 453.
90 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 115.
91 Ibid., 115-116.
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them. The Mohawk felt that these terms were mutually beneficial, as the Indians would 
obtain weaponry for the price of warring against enemy Indians.
There was a fine line between selling guns for trade purposes and affecting a 
security threat, as best illustrated in Virginia. While William Byrd supported the Indian 
arms trade, Nathaniel Bacon vehemently opposed this practice. As the gun trade was 
prohibited by the laws of the colony, Bacon blamed Anglo-Indian violence on the 
Governor’s willingness to arm the Indians instead of protecting loyal English subjects. In 
both Virginia and New Netherland, guns were important commodities in the peltry 
exchange as the Indians used guns to hunt furbearing animals. In New Netherland, the 
arms trade allowed the Mohawk to protect themselves against enemy Indians, including 
the Mahican and the French Indians. It seems probable that the Mohawk did not have 
guns prior to Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s expedition in 1634-1635 due to their 
curiosity of pistols and their request for Van den Bogaert and his Dutch counterparts to 
fire their weapons on four separate occasions.92 The trade in weapons and gunpowder 
generally created a unified and pacific relationship between the Dutch and the Mohawk, 
as the Mohawk saw the Dutch as their allies and protectors against outside threats. In 
Virginia, however, guns were turned against the colonists as shown by events 
surrounding Bacon’s Rebellion. The Chesapeake seems to have been a breeding ground 
for violence since the early years of English settlement, illustrated by the first Indian war 
of 1609-161493 and the 1622 and 1644 uprisings. Unlike Dutch-Mohawk relations,
92 Van den Bogaert, A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country, 39, note 69.
93 See J. Frederick Fausz, “An ‘Abundance of Bloodshed on Both Sides’: England’s First Indian War, 
1609-1614,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 98, no. 1 (January, 1990).
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English dealings with the Chesapeake natives were rarely mutually beneficial, especially 
after tobacco became the primary agricultural export in Virginia and the colonists 
continued to encroach upon native land to cultivate it. Linda France Stine argued that 
Bacon’s Rebellion was not only a response to the deerskin trade but also the colonists’ 
increasing need for agricultural land. According to Stine, when the colonists realized that 
they could not obtain proper licensure to engage in the skins market, they began killing 
Indians for their fertile lands.94 However, English colonists had been infringing upon 
native land since the early settlement period; this was not a new problem for the 
Chesapeake natives in the late seventeenth century. The North American fur trade 
illustrates the different dynamics and circumstances English and Dutch colonists faced 
when they entered into the peltry trade with the Indians. While both the English and the 
Dutch were forced to exchange weapons for furs to meet the requests of their Indian 
consumers, this trade clearly had different results in these colonies. The furs-for-guns 
exchange largely created a cohesive bond between the Dutch and the Mohawk, whereas 
the gun trade posed a danger to colonists in Virginia.
Dutch fur trading relations with the Mohawk never paralleled the violence that 
transpired in late seventeenth century Virginia. By the 1650s and 1660s, tension between 
the Dutch and the Mohawk did arise due to the competition for furs among Dutch 
colonists, which at times resulted in robbery and assaults against the natives. While the 
Mohawk took their complaints to court at Fort Orange, they did not retaliate by force and 
a Dutch-Mohawk war never occurred. Peace between the colonists and the Mohawk in
94 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 36.
43
the period before English control of the colony may have been a response to the Indians’ 
need for Dutch protection during the Beaver Wars.
In the 1650s, due to the lucrative nature of the beaver fur trade and the elimination 
of the WIC monopoly, individual colonists began competing for favor among the 
Iroquois in the hopes of concentrating the peltry trade in the hands of a few Dutchmen. 
This fierce competition for furs eventually contributed to a decline in price during the late 
1650s, as pelts over-flooded the market. Competition also led to violence against the 
natives. As the Indians exchanged their wares from house to house, they were sometimes 
beaten or blocked from traveling to other homes to trade.95 The Indians voiced their 
complaints regarding this behavior to the court at Fort Orange. On February 8, 1658, 
Jochim de Backer was punished for beating an Indian, forced to pay “two pounds 
Flemish” for his actions.96 The fur trade was vital to New Netherland society, and Dutch 
officials listened to complaints made by Indian fur traders as evidenced by this case.
Dutch officials were likely concerned that if Mohawk fur traders continued to be 
assaulted by the Dutch, these Indians would trade their furs with other Europeans, the 
French or the English, or seek revenge against the colonists.
Competition for furs led colonists or brokers to wait for Indian traders in the 
woods, bypassing the practice of door-to-door trade, to persuade the Indians to sell their
Q7furs to a single Dutch trader. The practice of using brokers was outlawed by the
colony; however, on June 6,1657, the court at Fort Orange permitted a one-year hiatus of
95 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 111,116.
96 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 352.
97 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 117.
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this law, allowing Indian brokers to be employed for trade at Fort Orange and the 
surrounding village of Beverwijck.98 According to Jaap Jacobs, employing Indian 
brokers was expensive and accessible only to the large fur traders, many of whom sat on 
the court. This ordinance, therefore, benefited some Dutch officials who established the 
hiatus for their own financial benefit." By 1660, debates over the use of Indian and 
Dutch brokers were ongoing. While the director general, Petrus Stuyvesant, eventually 
decided to prohibit the use of brokers, both Indian and Dutch, the court minutes from Fort 
Orange suggest that the use of brokers continued despite the illegality of the practice. On 
May 27,1660, court records show that some of the colonists brought to court for using 
brokers argued that they would continue to employ this practice “whether it was 
permitted or not.”100 The use of brokers was financially beneficial to colonists who could 
persuade the natives to trade their furs with them in the woods before the Indians began 
their door-to-door soliciting or who stole the furs outright. However, this practice was 
not advantageous to the Indians, who were sometimes robbed, maltreated, or beaten in 
the woods, or to the director general of the colony, who feared the decline of Dutch- 
Mohawk relations and trade. On June 26, 1660, the Mohawk appeared before the court at 
Fort Orange to request that brokers be disallowed as a result of Dutch violence and 
robbery against the Indian traders. According to the Mohawk, if Indians continued to be 
ill-treated in the woods, “ .. .they will go away and not be seen anymore.”101 The 
Mohawk also implied that they would wage war against the Dutch. As a response, the
98 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 299.
99 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 117.
100 Gehring, Fort Orange Court Minutes, 502.
101 Ibid., 503.
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magistrates theoretically forbid the colonists from using brokers under penalty of three 
hundred guilders and a one-year suspension of the fur trade.102 This conflict at Fort 
Orange and Beverwijck shows the importance the fur trade had on the daily lives and 
livelihood of the people living in this community, as the organization of the fur trade was 
constantly debated by ordinary colonists, magistrates, the director general, and the 
Indians who made this trade possible.
The Beaver Wars , a series of conflicts between the Iroquois and the French- 
supported Algonquians during the middle of the seventeenth century, may explain why 
the Mohawk did not retaliate by force against the Dutch during the conflict over 
brokerage. The Beaver Wars contributed to weakening the Mohawk, possibly preventing 
them from fighting against yet another enemy group, the Dutch. In addition, the Mohawk 
may have been pacified as the Dutch were their supplier of arms; the Mohawk depended 
on weapons for their survival and for the continuation of these wars.104 According to 
Dean R. Snow, the Iroquois fought the Algonquians during the Beaver Wars for a variety 
of reasons, only one of which being access and control of the fur trade. These wars were 
encouraged by the Dutch, English, and French, all of whom vied for control of the North 
American peltry market. The losses of natives to European diseases during the mid­
seventeenth century also contributed to this conflict as Indian groups attempted to avenge 
the deaths of their members by enslaving natives outside of their community and 
adopting them. The French Indians, or Hurons, were brutally beaten by the Mohawk,
102 Ibid., 504.
103 The Beaver Wars lasted for nearly six decades, ending with the signing of the Great Peace in Montreal 
in 1701. See Sleeper-Smith, “Cultures of Exchange in a North Atlantic World,” xxviii.
104 Stama, “The Native-Dutch Experience in the Mohawk Valley,” 33.
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with many Huron being incorporated and adopted into the Iroquois community.105 
Attacks on Algonquian nations triggered the French to move westward to engage in the 
fur trade.106 At the same time as the Beaver Wars were being fought, the Mohawk were 
also engaged in a series of wars with the Mahican. While the mid-seventeenth century 
was clearly a time of change for the Mohawk, marked by constant warfare transformed 
by firepower, relations between the Dutch and the Mohawk never escalated to war. As 
the Beaver Wars and Mohawk-Mahican Wars were fought, the Iroquois ultimately 
reinforced and strengthened their alliance with the Dutch, who provided them with 
protection through the sale of guns and offered other desirable trade goods such as duffel
1 (Y1and ironware. According to Frenchman Jerome Lalemant, who was involved in the 
Jesuit missions among the Huron, the Mohawk were victorious over the Huron because 
of the guns provided them by the Dutch. Lalemant argued that the Dutch were able to
1 ORsecure the beaver fur trade with the Mohawk by supplying them with firearms. The 
Dutch likely viewed the Mohawk as protectors as well, guardians of the fur trade and 
defenders against enemy groups, such as the Mahican and Munsees. Despite 
disagreements and tense relations over brokers, the Dutch-Mohawk relationship was 
mutually advantageous. “Dutch dependence on the Mohawks grew in much the same 
measure as Mohawk dependence on the Dutch.”109
105 Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 109-111, 114- 
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The concept of mutually dependent trade is critical to understanding why an event
such as Bacon’s Rebellion occurred in Virginia but not in the Dutch colony of New
Netherland. First, after the WIC monopoly ended, more colonists in New Netherland had
access to this lucrative trade. The opposite occurred in Virginia. While more colonists
were able to participate in the deerskin trade during the early years of frontier trading
forts, Governor Berkeley’s restrictions resulted in the ability of only a small minority of
elite colonists to engage in this market. Berkeley’s monopoly reduced participation,
while in New Netherland, accessibility to the trade increased. Moreover, Virginians were
engaged in the cultivation of tobacco, which required large tracks of Indian land. As the
natives were pushed off of their homelands and hunting grounds, tension with the English
settlers increased. Interestingly, Dutch relations with the Mahican and Munsees were
tenuous because these native groups did not have access to beaver furs and exchanged
their lands for Dutch imports. The Dutch did not engage in land sales with the Mohawk
until the 1660s, and in 1667, the colony was controlled by the English. Lastly, the arms
trade pacified Dutch-Mohawk relations because the Mohawk were engaged in combat
with other Indian groups, including the French-supported Huron. No outside European
force threatened the Chesapeake peltry trade. For reasons which are debatable yet largely
unanswered in the scholarship, English relations with the Chesapeake natives turned sore
very early in the colony’s existence. While guns were desired by the natives in Virginia
and were used to hunt furbearing animals, they were also taken up against the colonists.
Unlike the Mohawk, the Chesapeake natives did not rely on the Virginians for protection
against outside forces, including another European power. To the Virginia Indians, the
English were enemies, driving them away from their homeland and creating contentious
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relations among native groups. While the Dutch-Mohawk relationship was a partnership, 
mutually beneficial to the Dutch and Mohawk who needed each other for protection and 
material goods, the English and the Algonquians were engaged in a power struggle over 
lucrative skins and land.
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CONCLUSION
WHY THE PELTRY TRADE DIFFERED IN VIRGINIA AND
NEW NETHERLAND
Colonies in North America were established by the English and the Dutch to 
compete with Spain and engage in a mercantilist system for the benefit of the mother 
country. The seventeenth century fur trade in North America was profitable because it 
was a response to a declining market in Muscovy, a result of the overhunting of 
furbearing animals. The peltry trade, at least initially, was mutually beneficial to 
Europeans and the Indians who made this New World market possible. In exchange for 
skins and furs, the Indians of Virginia and New Netherland obtained guns and other 
necessary trade goods from the Europeans. Small trinkets and beads would not satisfy 
North America’s native fur traders. It is apparent from records left by Europeans 
involved in the fur trade, such as William Byrd I and Isaac de Rasiere, that the Indians 
were not only specific, but also demanding consumers of European products. While 
scholarship has often focused on Europeans as the exploiters of subaltern groups, this 
case study shows that the Indians involved in the North American peltry exchange were 
just as willing to exploit Europeans to obtain choice goods. European-Indian relations 
were pacific as long as the fur trade remained mutually beneficial.
Land encroachment was the antithesis of a working relationship between the 
Europeans and Native Americans. While the colonists at Jamestown initially struggled to 
develop a profitable economy, experimenting with various agricultural crops and 
searching for natural resources, tobacco eventually became the mecca of wealth for the
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colonists who cultivated it as well as the English Crown. In contrast, the Dutch settled 
New Netherland with the intent to develop a trade in beaver furs with the natives. The 
economic motivation of the Dutch colony is proven by the coat of arms of New 
Netherland, which features an image of the beaver.110 Virginia’s tobacco monoculture 
was a primary point of contention between the English colonists and the Indians. While 
the English and the Algonquians both sought a trade partnership, the cultivation of 
tobacco encroached upon native lands. As the English infringed on native grounds, the 
Indians likely saw their way of life disappearing, which created tension. The Indians 
were involved in a struggle for survival in the Chesapeake; the English, due to their 
superiority in battle, were victorious. Linda France Stine accurately suggested that 
“English perceptions of the Indians oscillated from enemy (taking up land) to friend 
(consuming trade goods).”111 In New Netherland, the Dutch-Indian trade revolved 
around the peltry market. The exchange of beaver furs for Dutch imports did not require 
the colonists to bargain for or steal Mohawk lands. New Netherland did not border 
Mohawk territory, which was located further into the interior. It is worth reiterating that 
the Dutch did have tenuous relations with the Mahican and the Munsees, both of whom 
exchanged their lands for European wares. Land encroachment clearly contributed to 
Anglo-Algonquian conflict; the absence of this infringement pacified Dutch-Mohawk 
relations.
Foreign competition in the fur trade, a force beyond the colonists’ control, helped 
to create a partnership between the Dutch and the Mohawk in New Netherland. This
110 Jacobs, The Colony o f New Netherland, 106.
111 France Stine, Mercantilism and Piedmont Peltry, 15.
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dynamic was not present in colonial Virginia. South Carolinians threatened the 
profitability of the trade in deerskin in Virginia; however, the natives gladly traded with 
this colony, especially after the violence of Bacon’s Rebellion. While the natives allied 
with Governor Berkeley received government protection as Tributary Indians, they did 
not need the Virginia colonists to protect them from an alien force, including the fur 
traders in South Carolina. In comparison, the Mohawk needed Dutch arms to fight 
against the French-supported Huron, whom they feared. Because the Dutch were well- 
aware of the threat the French and even the English in southern New England posed to 
the fur trade, they ensured that the Mohawk were content in their trade dealings, as 
illustrated by Harmen Meyndertsz van den Bogaert’s expedition. The trade in guns and 
powder to the Mohawk Indians by the Dutch seems to have strengthened their 
relationship, as both groups relied on each other for protection. These mutual bonds did 
not exist in Virginia, where violent conflict between the English and the Indians had been 
established by 1609.
Moreover, miscegenation was more prevalent in the Dutch colony of New 
Netherland than in Virginia, where it was virtually nonexistent. While interracial sex and 
family formation are outside of the scope of this project, it may explain, in part, why 
Dutch-Iroquois relations were generally peaceful while Anglo-Algonquian relations were 
tenuous. According to Adriaen van der Donck, interracial sex was commonplace before 
Dutch women arrived in the colony. Van der Donck wrote in his narrative, “ .. .several 
Dutchmen, before many Dutch women were to be had there, became infatuated with 
them [native women]. ... [I]f they were instructed as our women are, they would no
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doubt differ little from them, if at all.”112 An Englishmen in Virginia likely viewed 
Indian women in stark contrast to European females. The first recorded conjugal 
relationship between an Englishmen and an Indian was John Rolfe’s marriage to 
Pocahontas in 1614, which pacified Anglo-Powhatan relations for a time. It is well- 
documented that French traders gained access to furs by engaging in relations with native 
women, becoming part of their kinship network.113 Further studies may address this 
aspect of the fur trade in Virginia and New Netherland.
By 1710, and even before this date, the fur trade in Virginia was declining. 
Eventually, the colonists would surrender this trade due to competition from South 
Carolina. While the fur trade continued after Bacon’s Rebellion, the Occaneechee were 
no longer prominent players in this exchange. With the exception of Beverwijck, the fur 
trade also declined in New Netherland. By the end of the Dutch period, the colonists 
were involved in agricultural production, and by 1664, tobacco had outstripped the trade 
in beaver furs as the primary export item.114 When the English officially took ownership 
of the colony in 1667, the Mohawk allied with the conquerors, believing that they could 
continue the mutual benefits of the fur trade with the new inhabitants. However, the 
English did not protect the Mohawk from the enemy French.115 Subsequently, the
112 Van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, 75.
113 See Susan Sleeper-Smith, “Women, Kin, and Catholicism: New Perspectives on the Fur Trade,” in 
Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures o f Exchange in an Atlantic World (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2009).
114 Jacobs, The Colony of New Netherland, 128.
115 Snow, The Iroquois, 119.
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Mohawk had no other choice but to join with the French in the fur trade. According to 
Jerome Lalemant, the Mohawk feared the French and their weapons.116
The fur trade in North America was a market of exploitation for Europeans and 
Indians alike. In the case of the Dutch in New Netherland, the shared benefits of the 
lucrative fur trade created a long-lasting working relationship between the Dutch and the 
Mohawk. In Virginia, the trade in deerskin was marked by violence when access to the 
trade was restricted during Berkeley’s governorship and the English colonists continued 
to trespass onto native homelands. When the peltry trade was mutually beneficial, 
meaning that Europeans and Indians obtained desired goods of equivalent value, relations 
were relatively peaceful between the two groups. When this mutuality ceased to exist, 
however, tension and violence was the norm. The Indians were engaged in merchant 
capitalism as much as the European colonists with whom they traded their peltry.
116 Jerome Lalemant. ceNotable Embassy of the Iroquois, 1663-1664,” in In Mohawk Country: Early 
Narratives About a Native People, eds. Dean R. Snow, Charles T. Gehring, and William A. Stama (New 
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